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Reichenbach’s ε-Definition of Simultaneity
in Historical and Philosophical Pespective
§ 1. It is well-known that in the special theory of relativity the simultaneity
of distant events is frame-relative: two events simultaneous according to the
standard Einstein criterion as applied in one inertial frame are not simultaneous
according to the same criterion applied in a relatively moving inertial frame.
Not so well known is whether, given a fixed inertial frame, there is a fact of
the matter whether a pair of distant events are really simultaneous relative to
that frame. Einstein thought not. Reichenbach, at least according to the lore
philosophers of science are taught, thought not. And up until roughly a quarter
century ago, the thesis that frame-relative simultaneity is a matter of convention
was the prevailing view.
Not any more. There is now a widely espoused anti-conventionalist view in-
spired by a result published by David Malament in 1977: the standard Einstein
criterion is the only candidate for a frame-relative simultaneity criterion defin-
able from the causal structure of Minkowski space-time.1 Hence, according to
the neo-anti-conventionalist, if frame-relative simultaneity is conventional, then
it is conventional only in some minimal and not very exciting or robust sense.
However, claims as to what is exiting or robust, if they are to be mean-
ingful, must be claims about comparisons. I want to take this opportunity to
compare and contrast two possible conventionalist positions on frame-relative
simultaneity, one of them decidedly more robust than the other. The more ro-
bust of these is implicitly suggested by Einstein’s 1905 paper.2 The other, I
shall suggest, is the most plausible reading of Reichenbach’s conventionalism in
connection with his celebrated “ε-definition” of distant simultaneity. This will
give me the chance not only to engage in a bit of Reichenbach scholarship, but
also to impress upon the neo-anti-conventionalist camp that there is more than
a minimal conventionality thesis to take into account.
§ 2. In order to set up the conventionalist position suggested in Einstein’s
original 1905 paper, recall the procedure followed there. One establishes the
fixed points of an inertial frame (presumably by testing for inertial forces), lays
out a spatial coordinate grid using rigid rods and the laws of Euclidean geometry,
and institutes a natural clock at each fixed point. There remains the further
task of synchronizing these clocks if one is to be able to describe trajectories as a
function of a system-wide time. Without such one cannot assign a three-velocity
tangent vector to a point of the trajectory. So, one simply stipulates that the
time it takes for light to propagate from point A to point B of the frame equals
the time of propagation from B to A. From this follows the familiar Einstein
1David Malament, “Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of Simultaneity”, in:
Nouˆs 11, 1977, pp. 293–300.
2Albert Einstein, “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Ko¨rper”, in: Annalen der Physik 17,
1905, pp. 891–921.
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synchronization criterion, that a natural clock at A is in synchrony with natural
clock at B if
t2 =
t1 + t3
2
, (1)
where t1 is the time at A of light emission from A, t2 the time at B of its
reflection at B, and t3 the time at A of its return to A. The derivation of the
Lorentz transformations proceeds directly from this (and the validity of the light
postulate) by assuming that the “moving” frame uses the same synchronization
criterion from its point of view for co-moving clocks. In short, the procedure is
this. Adopt a synchronization procedure consistent with the empirically testable
fact that the average round trip speed of light in any frame is a fixed constant
c. Then apply the Principle of Relativity to that procedure in order to derive
the coordinate transformations to a relatively moving frame.
But if, as Einstein insists, the one-way speed of light assumption on which
clock synchronization is based is really just a matter of stipulation, what hap-
pens if one replaces it with an alternative stipulation compatible with the con-
stancy of round trip average speed, and then applies the Principle of Relativity
to the induced non-standard synchronization procedure? Does this yield a con-
sistent alternative 3+1-dimensional formulation of special relativity?
§ 3. With this question in mind, I began to scour the Reichenbach archives
for calculations to see if Reichenbach had indeed thought along these lines in
the course of formulating his famous ε-definition of clock synchronization,
t2 = t1 + ε(t3 − t1) (2)
from which, the standard Einstein criterion falls out as the special case ε = 1/2.
In 1921 Reichenbach published a preliminary sketch of his plan to develop an
axiomatization of relativity theory in such a way that it would have the virtue
of separating out the factual from the conventional components of the the-
ory by instituting only directly testable proposition as axioms and introducing
the conventional components as “coordinative” definitions. Bu this “Bericht
u¨ber eine Axiomatik der Einsteinschen Raum-Zeit-Lehre” introduces only the
standard Einstein synchronization criterion as a coordinative definition [Defini-
tion 5].3 The ε-definition first appears in print only in 1924 as Definition 2 of
the extensively reworked and vastly expanded culmination of that project, Ax-
iomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre.4 Moreover, its introduction there
appears to have been an eleventh-hour addition. There are two complete copies
of a monograph-length draft, suggesting that Reichenbach thought it ready, or
3Hans Reichenbach, “Bericht u¨ber eine Axiomatik der Einsteinschen Raum-Zeit-Lehre”,
in: Physikalische Zeitschrift XXII, 1921, pp. 683–687.
4Hans Reichenbach, Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre. Braunschweig:
Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn 1924. Definition 2 appears on p. 26. This corresponds to p. 35
of Maria Reichenbach’s translation, Axiomatization of the Theory of Relativity. Berkeley:
University of Califormia Press 1969.
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nearly ready for press, but in which still only the standard Einstein definition
appears. Only amongst scraps of loose handwritten pages did I find a precursor
(see fig. 1) the the ε-definition in the published version.5
[Insert Fig. 1]
The portion of typed text is the whole of Definition 5 cut out from a reprint of
the “Bericht” (see fig. 2) and the emmendations make it accord verbatim with
Definition 2 of the Axiomatik .
[Insert Fig. 2]
The context of its introduction also accords, although not verbatim, with the
published version — the middle of a proof of Proposition 6, which, in order to
grasp its upshot, requires some exposition of Reichenbach’s overall strategy.
§ 4. When Hermann Weyl reviewed Reichenbach’s Axiomatik ,6 he confessed
that he found it “less than satisfactory: overly tedious and too obscure” [wenig
befriedigend, zu umsta¨ndlich und zu undurchsichtig].7 This, Reichenbach later
complained, was based on a gross misunderstanding.8 In the review, Weyl
had characterized the Axiomatik as, in the main, not a philosophical, but a
purely mathematical investigation, and had registered the above assessment
“from a mathematical point of view” [nach mathematischen Gesichtpunkten].9
Reichenbach was dismayed that someone of Weyl’s rank could have missed his
main thrust.
Weyl, though, may have well have appreciated Reichenbach’s intentions more
fully than Reichenbach realized. The execution of the Axiomatik is in fact
more easily grasped from a mathematical than a philosophical point of view.
Reichenbach begins with the class of all possible world-lines in space-time and
then attempts to find conditions, involving only the conformal structure of the
space-time, sufficient to select out the distinguished subsets which correspond
to inertial frames. Using only the behavior of light rays, he defines separate
temporal and spatial metrics for individual frames, which he calls the “light-
geometry” [Lichtgeometrie], and then derives the Lorentz transformations as
the isometry boosts for the light-geometry. (A defect of this procedure, and
one certainly not lost on Weyl, is that the class of inertial frames cannot be
singled out in this fashion, but only a wider class of frames related by conformal
transformations. Reichenbach had sensed the problem, but probably at a stage
5Document HR-024-15-02 of the Hans Reichenbach Collection, Archives of Scientific Phi-
losophy and General Manuscripts. Reproduced by permission of the University of Pittsburgh.
All rights reserved.
6In: Deutsche Literaturzeitung 30, 1924, pp. 2122–2128.
7Ibid ., p. 2128.
8Hans Reichenbach, “U¨ber die physikalischen Konsequenzen der relativistischen Ax-
iomatik”, in: Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik 34, 1925, pp. 32–48. See especially Section II, pp. 37–38.
9Ibid .
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too late for him to make major revisions. Only in a later section does he alert
the reader to the difficulty, and then only in an attempt to mitigate the extent
to which it might be viewed as undermining his program.)
So far no mention is made of rigid rods and material clocks. These notions
are introduced only after the development of the light-geometry, at which point
Reichenbach sets out a series of “matter axioms” which collectively assert that
these material structures behave in accordance with the light-geometry and
thus the Lorentz transformations. The upshot of the entire work is that, apart
from the prohibition on super-luminal causal propagation, it is only these latter
assertions that separate relativity theory from classical space-time physics. The
physical axioms governing the behavior of light do not depend on a principle
of relative motion and are consistent with both the (relativistic) light-geometry
and the geometry [or rather, kinematics] of classical optics. As Reichenbach
explains:
It is remarkable that the Lorentz transformation, conceived in light-
geometrical terms, does not contain a new axiom but depends solely
on definitions and axioms of the single system. With respect to light,
there does not exist a special axiom of uniform translation. Our
derivation of the Lorentz transformation via the Galilean transfor-
mation has shown that it is merely a reorganization of the relations
of uniformly moving systems contained in the Galilean transforma-
tion into a new metrical determination. Physically new is Einstein’s
idea that material structures do not adjust to the Galilean metrical
determination but to the light-geometrical one.10
Faintly visible under this thumbnail sketch, in the notion of the “adjustment”
[Einstellung] of material structures to the light-geometry, is the spectre of Weyl
— or more precisely, that of Weyl’s generalization of Reimannian geometry in his
attempted unified field theory — which provides a clue as to why Reichenbach
pursued the strategy of developing a light-geometry in no way dependent on the
use of material metrical standards. Noteworthy is the fact that the first two
matter axioms are formulated in tune with the conceptual framework of gauge
field theory, asserting the path independence of the behavior of material rods
and clocks. Indeed, Reichenbach mentions in a footnote in the Introduction11
that a hint that the construction of a light-geometry is possible occurs in the
Appendix to the fourth edition of Weyl’s Raum-Zeit-Materie.12 The notion of
“adjustment” [Einstellung] is also taken over directly from Weyl. In his later
reply to Weyl’s review of the Axiomatik , though, Reichenbach clarifies that he
does not take this to be a concept with explanatory force so much as a short-
10Reichenbach, Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre, loc. cit., p. 58. I have used
here Maria Reichenbach’s translation, loc. cit., p. 76. Emphasis is in the original.
11Ibid., p. 10.
12Berlin, Springer 1921. There are in fact two appendices. Reichenbach obviously intends
to refer to Appendix I.
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hand for the problem of finding a fundamental theory of matter. It is worth
mentioning that Reichenbach there indicates that he regards the matter axioms
to hold only as a “first approximation” (even to the extent that they are locally
valid according to the general theory of relativity) and even cites the positive
result of Dayton C. Miller’s repetition of the Michelson-Morley experiment as
potential evidence (assuming the result is not spurious, as it turned out to be).
In contrast to his attitude toward the matter axioms, Reichenbach regards the
light axioms as completely secure and describes the light-geometry as the most
natural description (from the point of view of descriptive simplicity) of the in-
trinsic geometry of the electromagnetic field.
§ 5. What role, then, does Reichenbach’s ε-definition of simultaneity play
in the construction of the light-geometry? The sad answer is, disappointingly
little, at least from a formal point of view. It is introduce early on, primarily in
order to show how little needs to be assumed in order to introduce a global time
function in conformity with causality constraints. The method is to choose
a central “clock” in the sense of an arbitrarily parameterized world line and
then to export this parameterization to every other world line in space-time via
ε-synchronization for an arbitrary, but fixed value of ε. Reichenbach quickly
specializes to ε = 1/2 in order to define a time function for each “stationary
spatial” frame [stationa¨res ra¨umliches Koordinatensystem]. The class of inertial
frames is later extracted from the class of all “stationary spatial” frames.
There is thus no inkling of the possibility of an invariant non-standard syn-
chronization criterion for inertial frames. Rather, it is more likely that Reichen-
bach believed that the restriction to ε = 1/2 is in fact necessary for selecting
out the inertial frames in the course of constructing the light-geometry. This
surmise is reinforced by a comment four years later in his Philosophie der Raum-
Zeit-Lehre,13 that Einstein’s definition is in fact essential for the special theory
of relativity: “Diese Definition ist zwar fuer die spezielle Relativitaetstheorie
wesentlich ...”.14 He does go on to say that, nonetheless, this definition is not
epistemologically necessary — any choice between zero and one for the param-
eter ε would work and could not be said to be false. But work in what regard?
In the Axiomatik , after Reichenbach introduces the ε-definition and puts
it to limited technical use, there follows what might appropriately be called a
philosophical scholium, though not labeled as such. It begins by characterizing
the light axioms so far introduced as the “topological axioms of time order”
and proceeds to call attention to the “topological problem of simultaneity”: in
essence, does causal structure pick out at a given space-time point a unique hy-
persurface as causally neither prior nor posterior, or, as is the case if there is a
limiting causal process, does there exist an indeterminate region corresponding
to an entire family of distinct hypersurfaces? In the former case it is appropri-
13Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1928. Translation by Maria Reichenbach, The Philosophy of
Space and Time. New York: Dover 1957.
14Ibid ., p. 151. Emphasis mine.
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ate to speak of absolute simultaneity; in the latter, simultaneity is “relative”
insofar as the definition of simultaneity is not uniquely determined by causal
structure. The word “relative” here, however, does mean “specific to the special
theory of relativity.” In the Introduction to the Axiomatik , Reichenbach care-
fully distinguishes between what he calls the epistemological and the physical
relativity of simultaneity. The former refers merely to the underdetermination
by causal structure. The latter is specific to Einstein’s theories of special and
general relativity.
It says in the special theory that a particular definition of simul-
taneity [ε = 1/2] for uniformly moving systems gives rise to the
complete equivalence of all measurement procedures and in conse-
quence the laws of nature have the same form for all such systems.
[Sie besagt in der speziellen Theorie, dass bei einer gewissen Defi-
nition der Gleichzeitigkeit (Definitition 8) fu¨r gleichfo¨rmig bewegte
Systeme vo¨llige Geichartigkeit aller Massverha¨ltnisse enststeht und
die Naturgesetze dann fu¨r solche Systeme die gleiche Form haben.]15
To summarize in light of the results achieved in the Axiomatik : The epistemo-
logical relativity of simultaneity refers only to the fact that numerous distinct
light-geometries (e.g., Galilean vs. Lorentzian) are consistent with the light ax-
ioms. The physical relativity of simultaneity speaks to the consequences of the
further imposition of the matter axioms, to the effect that the standard prac-
tices of measurement using material rods and clocks agree with the choice of
ε = 1/2 and the resulting Lorentzian geometry. Thus, as far as the Axiomatik
is concerned, any adoption of a non-standard simultaneity criterion would ne-
cessitate the adoption of a different and highly irregular set of matter axioms
appealing to “compensatory” factors and the like.
As for the position in his Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, Reichenbach
sends no signal that he now intends the ε-definition to pertain to any thesis
bolder than than the epistemological relativity of simultaneity. The comment
that “if the special theory of relativity prefers the ... definition [that] sets ε equal
to 1/2, it does so on the ground that this definition leads to simpler relations”16
need not be construed to indicate anything more than a belief that other choices
would necessitate the adoption of a different set of more complicated matter
axioms. It is true that, in contrast to the Axiomatik , he explicitly mentions
directionally dependent choices of ε, but these are in connection with the price
of adopting a classical (Galilean) light-geometry.17 The only portion of text
that even remotely suggests otherwise reads:
15Reichenbach, Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeit-Lehre, loc. cit., p. 8. The trans-
lation is mine. Maria Reichenbach’s translation, loc. cit., p. 11, does not adequately convey
the intent of the passage.
16Maria Reichenbach’s translation, loc. cit., p. 127.
17See, for example, p. 204 of Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, loc. cit. (p. 176 of Maria
Reichenbach’s translation, loc. cit.). Note that the example worked at length in § 26 is an
explicit illustration of this.
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It was believed that the coupling of the space and time axes supplied
by the Lorentz transformation, according to which every choice of
the time axis determines a corresponding space axis as the conju-
gate diameter, signifies a more fundamental junction of space and
time. This coupling, however, is relatively unimportant because it
is based on an arbitrary additional requirement, introduced only for
descriptive simplicity, for which there is actually no epistemological
need.18
But the passage goes on:
The mistake committed here is the one pointed out on page 146;
it springs from the erroneous conception that there is a relation
between the relativity of simultaneity and the relativity of motion.19
And indeed, if one goes back to consult page 146,20 it is clear that what Reichen-
bach means is that the epistemological relativity of simultaneity “has nothing
to do with the relativity of motion. It rests solely on the existence of a finite
limiting velocity for causal propagation.”21
§ 6. What I have argued is that Reichenbach nowhere suggests the possibility
of using a non-standard simultaneity criterion in conjunction with the principle
of relativity. Such a criterion would have the following properties. It would
result in the same light-geometry as the standard Einstein criterion in the sense
that it would yield the same temporal and spatial measures as the standard
within each inertial frame. Only the Lorentz transformations would need to
be replaced by a conjugate representation of the same group. But each of
the matter axioms would remain satisfied without revision, since these in fact
do not explicitly involve the Lorentz transformations. I further suggest that
Reichenbach believed that this could not be done.
Many a reader may wonder whether indeed it can. Rather than formulating
such in terms of ε directly, I’ll simply state a one way speed of light rule that
suffices. Using spherical coordinates, let θ be the angle from the azimuth. Then
stipulate that the speed of light V in the direction θ satisfies the condition:
V (θ) =
c2
c+ a cos θ
, (3)
where c is the usual average round-trip speed of light and a is an arbitrary scalar
less than c. As an exercise, one can verify that this satisfies the requirement of
18Maria Reichenbach’s translation, loc, cit., p. 189.
19Ibid.
20This pagination refers to Maria Reichenbach’s translation, loc. cit. In the original it is
p. 172.
21Maria Reichenbach’s translation, loc, cit., p. 146.
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constancy of average round-trip, derive the corresponding conjugate represen-
tation of the Lorentz transformations, and develop a complete, non-standard
3+1-dimensional formulation of special relativity. Moreover, it is not too dif-
ficult to show that the most general category of frame invariant non-standard
simultaneity criteria is given by letting the magnitude of the cosine term in the
denominator represent the projection of an arbitrary irrotational vector field (of
norm less than c) onto the azimuth.22
The intent here is not to denigrate Reichenbach for failing to realize a pos-
sibility that in fact exists. Rather it is to come to a clear understanding as to
the range of possibilities that he in fact did recognize. Indeed, it is to his credit
to have articulated the distinction between what he called the epistemological
and the physical relativity of simultaneity. For that distinction, just slightly
re-articulated, serves to demarcate two distinct levels of convention potentially
inherent in the adoption of a simultaneity crierion. The epistemological level
concerns the degree of fixity dictated by causal structure alone, entirely apart
from constraints deriving from the standard deployment of material measur-
ing rods and clocks for the determination of spatial distances and proper-time
lapses, respectively. The “physical” level corresponds to the degree of freedom
that remains with these latter constraints in place. Much of the debate on the
conventionality of simultaneity has tended to suffer from not tracking carefully
enough the difference between these two levels.
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